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In a decision process (gambling or dynamic programming problem) with finite state space and
arbitrary decision sets (gambles or actions), there is always available a Markov strategy whieh
uniformly (nearly) maximizes the average time spent at a goal. Jf the decision sets are closed.
there is even a stationary strategy with the same property.
Examples are given to show that approximations by discounted or tinite horizon payoffs are
not useful for the general average ri~ward problem.
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.. Markov strategy * average reward criterion

1. Introduction

The subject of this paper is finite state, di~crete time decision processes with single
fixed goals and arbitrary decision sets (all to be defined precisely in Section 2).
Various objective functions associated with such ;>Tocesses have been studied
extensively, among them: maximizing the probability of reaching the goal
[7,8,15,19,20]; minimizing the expected time or cost to the goal
[4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17]~ maximizing the expected total number of times at the goal
[15]; maximizing the expected total discounted rewards at the goal [2,6, 13, 16];
maximizing the probability the goal is hitinfmitely often [7, 11, 19,20]; and maximiz
ing the expected average time at the goal [3,6,10, 13, 16]. We are concerned here
with this last objective; finite state goal problems with average reward criterion,
In the pioneering work of Howard [141, and much of the subsequent research,
e.g. Ross [16], the assumption of finiteness of number of gambles available at each
point was essential, and led to constructive determinations of an optimal stationary
strategy. If the number of gambles at some states are infinite, however, optimal
strategies need not exist, and station3i'y strateg.es are not at all good in general.
Ross [16, p. 144] has raised the question of determining the smallest class of strategies
which are e-optimal for average reward problems. This problem has been studied
by Chitashvili [3] and Fainberg [10]. It is the purpose of this paper to completely
answer that question in the case of finite state goal problems.

It is shown in Theorem I that in every such problem with closed sets of gambles
there always exists a stationary strategy which is uniformly e-optimal; this result is
used to show (Theorem 2) that in the finite state goal problem with arbitrary decision
slets there always exists a Markov strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal.
Examples are given to show that the relationship between these average reward
problems, and problems with discounted or finite horizon objectives, is not very close.

2. Statements of results

Definition 2.1. As in [4], a finite state goal problem is a triple (X.

r. g). where X

l!oo a finite set, r associates to each point x E X a nonempty collection r(x) of
probability measures on X, and g E X is a distinguished element of X.
The set X represents the state space or fortune space of the process, F( x) the
actions or gambles available at the state x, and g the 'goal' state.
Much of the notation will follow that of Dubins and Savage [7]. The Dirac
delta-measure at x will be denoted by S(x). A strategy is a function from finite
sequences in X (including the empty sequence '0') to probability measures on X.
The same symbol. u, will be used to denote both a strategy and the probability
measure generated by u on the product sigma-algebra on X'" (X endowed with
the discrete sigma algebra). E"f will denote the integral of f with respect to CT. A
.stTareg)' (T in rat x. written u E Fj x. is a strategy CT such that u(r/J) E r(x), and
17( XI.' ..• x.. ) E r(x,,} for all XI. Xb ... X" E X and all n E N. A strategy a is Markov
if 17(x! •...• x,,)=u(x; •...• x;.> whenever X,,=X~, and is stationary if
u(x ••...• x,,) = CT(X;, ... • x~J whenever x" = x: w The conditional strategy given
x, •...• x'" lTLxh""X,,], is defined by CT[X" ...• xn](x)=u(Xt •... ,x",x). For a
function r from X to subsets of probability measures on X,
the closure of is
the function defined -by t(x) = nx) for all x. where S is the total-variation norm
closure of the set of measures 8.

r,

r,

Definition 2.2. N(tJl:X~~-+{O. 1. .... n} is the function

that i... the numher of times the goal is visited in the first

11

steps of the game.

Definition 2.3. The hitting time of C eX. 1(", is defined hy Tc(x l , X2,' •• )
mint j: x, E C} if such a j exists. and = 00 otherwise. The time between the t1 - J st
and nth viJilS to the goal. T". is defined inductively by To:=;; O. and
0::

T"f.{,.x! .... ),,-;min{j: 1:, J(x,.x!.... )=k and

if "uch

OJ

I exi ... ts. and ==.x. otherwise.

Xk'J::::g}

Definition 1.4. For a strategy cr, the expected average time at the goal usin.g u, A( u).
is defined to be A(cr) = Eu(lim sup N(n)/ n), and the maximal expected average
time at the goal starting at state x, A(x), is A(x) = sup{A(u): crE r/ x}.
Definition 1.5. Let A .. A 2 , A 3 be the functions
A1(cr) = E u liminf(N(n)/ n),
n

A 2 (u)

=liminf En-(N(n)/ n)

and

"

A 3 (u) = limsup Eu(N(n)/n),
n

and similarly let
Aj(x)=sup{Aj(u): O'Er/X}.

Remark. In most of the previous research on average reward problems the payoffs
A 2 and A] have been used, apparently for mathematical expediency. The average
reward criterion A(u) defined above seems more natural to th? authors, and in any
event it turns out (Corollary following Theorem 2) that these criteria are equivalent
for finite state problems.
The following theorem,. the· main result of this paper, states that in every finite
state goal problem with closed (hence compact) sets of gambles, there always exists
a stationary strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal.

Theorem 1. If (X, r, g) is any goal problem with IXI < 00 and rex) closed for all
x, then for each e> 0 there is a stationary strategy 0''' in r satisfying A (aexT x]) ~
A(x) -

E.

for all x EX.

A version of Theorem 1 for the payoff A 2 is a special case of a result of Chitashvili
[3] and one for payoff A 3 is a special case of the work of Fainberg [10]. (See also
Chapter 7 of Dynkin and Yushkevich [9],) These authors consider the general
average reward problem for finite X and compact
and exploit the relationship
between the l3-discounted payoff and the average reward payoff. This approach
won't work for payoff A. As the following example, which is similar to example 3
of Bather [2], shows even if the limit of good (discounted or finite horizon) strategies
exist, this limiting strategy may be wort:lles<; in all respects.

rex)

Example. X ={a, b, g};
r(g)={5(g)},

r(b)={()(b)},

}'( a ) = {5 (g) / n + 0 ( b) In 2 + (1 - 1/ n - 1/ n 2) 8 ( a ): n ~ I} u { (j ( a )}.

As f3 ~ 1, the limit of good strategies for the l3-discounted re\:ard problem exists,
and in fact is the stationary strategy which uses B( a) at state' a', Similarly for the

limit. as n ~ 00. of strategies which are good for the n-step problem. But using 8(a)
always at state •a' will never lead to the goal.

Theorem 2. If (X,

r, g) is any goal problem with IXI < 00, then for each

is a MarkotJ strategy un! in

r satisfying A(um[x]) ~ A(x) -

I>

E

> 0 there

for all x EX.

Theorem 1 and the proof of Theorem 2 yield the following corollary.
Corollary. If (X, J~ g) is a goal problem with
A(x) = AI(x) = A:!(x)

= AJ(x)

IXI < 00,

then

for all x EX.

3. Proofs
The proof pf Theorem 1 requires several lemmas. The first is an easy exercise.
Lemma I

Iimsup ml( 1'1 + ... + Tm
"J

1\

n

n·"'",r

IXI <00 and r= f: then

lim [inr{E,,( T.

here, a

= Iimsup--.

.,.:.

Lemma 2. If

,\f

N(n)

)

1\

M):

V' E

1'1 x}] =

inf{E,,( 1'.): a

El'l x};

_1

h:= mine a, b).

Proof. ',.,,;:' Trivial. since E,,( 1') /I M) ~ E,,( 7'.) for all a and all M .
. ~. Let lim:\1_~\.[inf{E<T(1'1 /1M): O'Erlx}]=a. If a =+00, then we are done. so
suppose a < 00 and fix F > O. Note that
inC{ 1:"" ( 1'1

1\

/I):

0' E

r/ x} is nondccreasing in

n, and bounded a hove by a.

(l)

For each

II

= I. 2. _. _pick

E".( T,

/I

0'" E

n) < a + F:.

1"1 x satisfying
(2)

Since the number of finite sequences in X is countable. and T(x) is compact for all
t. fhac exist<; a \ubscqucnce {an,} and (T E r/ x such that

lim
~

.,:

(J'''k

-= a.

(3)

Since

was arbitrary, the proof will be complete once it is shown that

£

EcA T I ) < a + 3£.

(4)

Case 1. E a ( Tt ) < 00. Pick M so that

BrAT,1I M) ~ ErATt ) -

By (3) we can pick K
E UK (T,

Since K

~

II

~

(5)

E.

M so that

M) ~ E C7 (T}

f\

M) -

(6)

$.

M, it follows that

E UK (T,

II

K) ~ EUt< (T,

II

M).

(7)

Hence
a + e > E"'J( ( T)

II

K) ~ EUJ( (T11\ M) ~ E C7 ( 1'1

1\

M) -

E ~

EfA 1'1} - 2£,

where the inequalities follow from (2), (7), (6) and (5) respectively. This completes
Case 1.
Case 2. Err ( T,) = 00. Pick M so that b"".r( T t 1\ M) ~ a + 1, and pick K ~ M as in
(6). Then
a + E ~ E 17 (1'. II K) ~ E (T) 1\ ,\1) - E ~ E lT ( 1'1 AM) - ea + 1- e
J(

eT ,.;

(by (2), (7), (6) and choice of M), a contradiction for e<~. Thus E.. (1'.)
(assuming a < (0) and case 1 applies. This completes the proof. 0

<00

Lemma 3. Let M be finite and define T;:= T; /I M. If ErA 1';) ~ a for all a in rat g,
then
liminf(T; + ... + 1'~)1 n? a a.s. a for all (T in rat g.
"1_00

Proof. Fix a in r at g. Let Fo = {4>, X N }, and for It ~ 1, let Fn be the sigma-fk:ld
generated by T;, ... , T~. Then Y j = T;- Eu (T:lFi-') is a martingale difference
sequence satisfying IYil ~ 1'; ~ M almost surely. Consequently, 0/ nn=~=, Yj -+ 0
almost surely. Since E..(TjIFj_.)? a almost surely, it follows that
liminf( T; + ... +
n-OC

1'~)/ n =

liminf{(L. r { 1'; IFn ) + ... + E,r( T;,IF" d)1 n} ~ a
Il-~

a.s.
Lemma 4. If

(T.

0

Ix1< 00 and r = J" then

limsup N(n)/ n ~ (inf{E 1'1):
lT (

(T '::

r/ g}r 1 a.s.

(T

for all a in rat g.

"""00

Proof. Let inf{Eu(1',): aE r/g}= a.
Case 1 a < 00. Fix E > O. By Lemma 2 it is possible to find MEN so that
inf{EA1'] /I M): (T E r/ g} ~ a-E. Now define 1'~:= T; 1\ M. We have, t:y Lemma 3.
liminf(TI + ... + 1'h)/n ~ liminf(T; +... + T~)/n ~ a -

E

r at g. Thus, by Lemma 1,

almost surely for all u in
N(n).

limsup--~
'l·~>:

(a - F)-

I

(8)

n

r

almost surely for all u in
at g. Since E > 0 was arbitrary, the desired conclusion
follows from (8).
Case 2 a = 00. Then E T I ) = 00 for all U E rj g, and it follows easily from Lemmas
1,2 and 3 as in Case 1 that lim N(n)jn=O a.s. for all UE rig. 0
rT

(

Proof of Theorem 1. Let ;nf{E,,( T]): u E r; g} = a. If a = +00, then by Lemma 4
A(g) =() and hence A(x) =0 for all XE X. But then every strategy, in particular
every stationary strategy, is (trivially) optimal.
Suppose a < 00 and fix e > O. By [4, Theorem 4.1] there is a stationary strategy
(T" in r satisfying

(9)
Let C c X be the closed communicating class relative a""" containing g (which
is dearly recurrent). By [7, Theorem 3.9.2] there is a stationary strategy (TX''' in
satisfying

r

(T' "[ X ]( 7~-

< ,Xl) ::?' sup{ 0'( Tc < (0):

U E

1'/ x} -

£

for all x

E

X.

(l 0)

Define the stationary strategy (Tx in r by u""(x) = u"'(x) if x E C, and = (ix·,,(x)
if x f!. C. The remainder of the proof consists in showing that for any strategy If in
r at x, fT' sati:-.fics
(11)

A(a'[x])?-A((T)-·2F.

Fix

(T

1"/ x. By [16, Theorem 4.71, (9), (10) and the fact that

E

A( (T°Tx]) :;;: u"""[x]( Tc < ro)[E,r'I.t:J( T, )]-1
~ (T(

::?'

a? 1, it follows that

(T-"'//[x]( T c < (0) . a-' J -

E

Tt.. < (0) . a·· I - 21'.

if' "":

Since A(
(1'( T 1 < (0) . A(g) ~ if( 1~ < (0)' A(g). and since 0,::; A
inequality in (11) follows hy Lemma 4. This completes the proof. 0

~~

I. tile

In Howard's treatise [14]. where l'(x) is finite for all .t, a 'policy-improvement'
algorithm b given which converges to that stationary strategy which is optimal
among all stationary strategies. Theorem 1 implies that the resulting stationary
Siratcgy of Howard's technique is optimal even among all strategies.
For the proof of Theorem 2 we use

"emma 5. J( iX I <:

I:

(T -

iT Ii

<'

r

X', then for every if E I x and each f' > 0 there is a (T E F/ x with
r. :\10reove" if iT is stationary. then a cau be chosen to he Markov.

Proof. Fix e > 0, and pick u(0) so that IICT(0) - 17(0)11 < e/2. For each finite sequence
Xto X2" .• ,Xn of elements in X, pick O'(XI, ••. ,xn ) E r(x n ) so that !!f]"' Xl" •• ,xn ) 
U(Xt> ... ,xn )II<F/2"+l[XI"+'. If u is stationary, pick O'(XI, •..• Xi .) so that
U(Xb' .. , Xn ) = O'(x~, . .. ,x~) whenever Xn = x~. It is easy to verify that the strategy
0' so chosen satisfies I u- u II < e, and is Markov if u is stationary.
0
Proof of Theorem 2 completed. Fix E > 0, and let A be that for the problem
(X,f,g), that is, A(x)=sup{A(CT): O'Ef/x}. By Theorem 2 there is a stationary
oo
strategy u in f satisfying A(uOO[x]) ~ A(x) - E for all x E X. By Lemma 5 there
exists a Markov strategy urn in r with II urn - 0"-:'11 < E. Since 0 ~ A ~ A ~ 1, urn
satisfies
A(um[x]) ~ A(uOO[x]) - e ~ A(x) - 2£ ~ A(x) - 2£
for all x EX.

0

Proof of the CoroUary. Observe that. by Fatou's Lemma, A I ~ A z ~ A) ~ A. Next.
as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can find a stationary strategy u:£ in t which is
uniformly (nearly) optimal for A. But for stationary strategies. lim N( n)/ 11 exists
almost surely. and application of the Dominated Convergence Theorem shows
A = A 1= A 2 = A.~. Lemma 5 implies that A = A, and A, = Ai for i = 1,2,3, and this
completes the proof. 0
Remarks. Although A(x)=A 1(x)=A 2 (x)=A 3 (x) for all x if IXI<oo, it is easy to
sec that IXI<oo does not imply A(CT)=A.(u)=A2(u)=A~(u) for all U' in r
However. the proof of Theorem 2 shows that there is always a Markov strategy
which is uniformly (nearly) optimal with respect to A, A., A 2 • and A 3 simultaneously.
In fact the e-optirnal strategies constructed in Theorems 1 and 2 are even easily
seen to be persistelllly e-optimal [8], since uniformly good stationary strategies are
automatically persistently good.

4. Other reward criteria

This paper leaves open the question of whether stationary strategies (in the
IXI < 00, r = t case) and Markov strategies (ill the general IXI < 00 case) are
uniformly adequate for the more general avprage reward problem in which reward
r(x) is obtained at each visit to state x. ThlY suspect the answer is affirmative, but
the techniques u~cd in these proofs do (lot (. ven clfry over in the special case of a
goal set G c X (i.e. r(x) = 1 if x E a, =0 otherwis t:), even if r == t.
Example. X

= {a, b. g, g'};

r(a)

= {(cS(b) + 8(g))/2} u {5(g'j},

r(g) ={5(g)},

((g')

= {cS(b)};

n bl = {o(b)},

and G = {g, g'l. If one is at state a, and wishes to minimize his expected time to 0,
or maximize his probability of hitting G (approaches used in the above proofs), he
uses ~(g'), which is bad for maximizing the average time in G.
The relationship between the average reward criterion, and discounted or finite
horizon reward payoffs seems to be rather weak, perhaps because for the average
reward problem, a gambler is not penalized for 'resting' at neutral states for long
periods initially, as long as he- ['ventually makes good decisions later. In discounted,
or finite horizon problems, on the other hand, the gambler is penalized heavily for
staying at worthless states for,long periods initially, but is not penalized much for
making bad decisions in the distant future. Neither the e-optimal stationary strategies
guaranteed by Blackwell's results [2] for the discounted reward problem, nor the
F-optimal Markov strategies found by backward induction [6, 13] seemed useful in
<Jnalyzing the average reward problem.
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